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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
RICH COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, Plaintiff 
vs 
EARL F. PASSEY, CLERK, 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
RICH COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT Defendent 
PLAINTIFF'S 
BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action for a writ of mandamus to be 
issued by this court in the exercise of its original 
jurisdiction under Section 4 of Article 8 of the Utah 
Constitution as shown by the complaint filed in this 
cause. Plaintiff Board of Education has duly and 
legally performed all acts required by Chapter 13 of 
Title 75 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1943, to be done 
prior to the issuance of $185,000 School Building 
Bonds by said Board (including the holding of an 
election on May 15, 1951, and the passing of a reso-
lution authorizing the issuance of bonds). Defen-
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dant, the Clerk of said Board, failed and refused to 
sign said bonds to the amount of $162,000 and as a 
result plaintiff board is unable to sell them. The 
purpose of this action is to obtain an order of the 
court requiring defendant to sign said bonds. 
Defendants' reason for failing and refusing to 
sign the aforementioned bonds is his belief that they 
represent an excess of indebtedness on the part of the 
school district above and beyond its legal limitation. 
The assessed value of the taxable property in Rich 
County School District is ( $2,870,761,) as deter-
mined by the last (the 1951) assessment. This 
figure is 40% of $7,176,902.50, that being the 
amount determined by the Assessor to be the reason-
able fair cash value thereof. Four per cent of the 
first figure is $114,830.44, whereas four per cent of 
the second is $287,076.10. The total outstanding 
debt, exclusive of the issue here in question is 
$86,400, which added to the $185,000 issue in contro-
versy amounts to $271,400. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. Utah Statute as amended provides the debt limi-
tation of a school district shall be four per cent of 
one hundred per cent (100%) of the reasonable 
fair cash value of taxable property within the 
school district. 
2. The Utah statute as amended does not violate the 
constitution of Utah for the word "value" as 
used in the constitution means the reasonable 
fair cash value. 
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3. The total debt of the district, including, the 
aforesaid bonds, will not exceed the satutory 
limit of four per cent of the reasonable fair cash 
value of the property in the district. 
ARGUMENT 
The applicable statutory provision is section 75-
13-12 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1943, the pertin--
ent part of which, as amended by Chapter 84 of the 
Laws of Utah, 1951, reads as follows: 
"The board shall also file with said clerk a 
statement showing the approximate number of 
inhabitants and the value of taxable property 
in the district, that the amount of bonds pro-
posed to be issued, including existing indebted-
ness, does not exceed four per cent of one 
hundred per cent ( 100%) of the reasonable fair 
cash value of taxable property in school districts 
of cities of the first class or four per cent of one 
hundred per cent ( 100%) of the reasonable fair 
cash value of taxable property in all other school 
districts, that the election at which the question 
of issuing bonds was submitted was lawfully 
called and held, that all proceedings in relation 
to the proposed issue of bonds in said district 
were lawfully conducted, and that such bonds 
may be lawfully issued." (Emphasis supplied) 
Prior to the 1951 amendment, this part of the statute 
read: 
"The board shall also file with said clerk a 
statement showing the approximate number of 
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inhabitants and the value of taxable property in 
the district, that the amount of bonds proposed 
to be issued, including existing indebtedness, 
does not exceed three per cent of the value of 
taxable property in school districts of cities of 
the first class or four per cent of the value of 
taxable property in all other school districts, 
that the election at which the question of issuing 
bonds wes submitted was lawfully called and 
held, that all proceedings in relation to the pro-
posed issue of bonds in said district were lawful-
ly conducted, and that such bonds may be law-
fully issued." (Emphasis supplied) 
Defendent does not deny that the bonds sought · 
to be issued by plaintiff board will fall within the 
limit prescribed by the statute as amended, but he 
asserts that the amendment violates the Constitution 
of Utah in establishing as a basis for computing the 
four per cent debt limit, "one hundred per cent 
( 100%) of the reasonable fair cash value" rather 
than the assessed valuation as shown on the assess-
ment rolls. The issue presented to the court is the 
determination of the exact limit to which the plain-
tiff may incur indebtedness under the Utah Consti-
tution. 
Article 14, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution 
reads in part as follows : 
"When authorized to create indebtedness as 
provided in Section 3 of this Article, no county 
shall become indebted to an amount, including 
existing indebtedness exceeding two per centum. 
No city, town, school district or other munici-
pal corporation, shall become indebted to an 
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amount, including existing indebtedness, ex-
ceeding four per centum of the value of the tax-
able property therein, the value to be ascertain-
ed by the last assessment for State and County 
purposes, previous to the incurring of such in-
debtedness;" 
This provision was in said section at the time of the 
adoption of the constitution in 1895 and has been in-
cluded therein ever since. The problem involved 
here is the determination of the meaning of the words 
"the value of the taxable property therein, the value 
to be ascertained by the last assessment for State 
and County purposes, previous to the incurring of 
such indebtedness." It is contended by the defendent 
that this language means the assessed valuation as 
shown on the assessment rolls of the County. Plain-
tiff, ho·wever, believes that this language should be 
given the meaning intended by the framers of the 
constitution: that the word "value" means full cash 
value and that the assessment referred to is merely a 
guide to minimize discord in the determination of 
that value. 
Until 1947 this question could not have arisen 
because the law, now Section 80-5-1 of the Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, required that all taxable property 
be assessed at its full cash value. However, in 1947 
this statute was amended to require that all taxable 
property "be assessed at 40ro of its reasonable fair 
cash value." Plaintiff's position is that this amend-
ment to the statutory law of Utah does not change 
the substance of the constitutional debt limit of the 
School District. 
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There is no reported Utah decision on this ques-
tion but the matter has been decided by the supreme 
courts of various other states. In N. W. Halsey & 
Co. v. City of Belle Plaine, 104 N.W. 494 (Iowa Su-
preme Court, 1905) , the plain tiff was the successful 
bidder for an issue of bonds of the defendent city and 
brought suit to recover his earnest money on the 
theory that the bonds for \Vhich he bid \vere void. 
The plaintiff contended that the issuance of said 
bonds would cause the debt limit of the city to be 
exceeded. Section 3 of Article 11 of the Iowa Consti-
tution read: 
"No minicipal corporation shall be allowed to 
become indebted in any manner, or for any pur-
pose, to an amount in the aggregate exceeding 
five per centum on the value of the taxable 
property within such * * * corporation-- to be 
ascertained by the last state and county tax lists, 
previous to the incurring of such indebtedness." 
(Emphasis supplied) 
The applicable statute read: 
"All property subject to taxation shall be 
valued at its actual value * * * and shall be ass-
essed at twenty-five per cent of such value. 
Such assessed value shall be taken and consider-
ed as the taxable value of such property, upon 
which the levy shall be made. Actual value of 
property as used in this chapter shall mean its 
value in the market in the ordinary course of 
trade.'' 
at the time the bonds were sought to be issued and at 
the time of the case. If the assessed valuation were 
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· accepted as the "value of taxable property" referred 
to in the constitution, the bonds in question would 
have caused an excess of indebtedness. If, however, 
the actual value of the taxable property which was 
assessed legally at only twenty-five per cent of that 
actual value were used as the debt basis, then there 
'vould have been adequate constitutional authority 
for the issuance. 
At the time the Iowa Constitution was adopted, 
the law making property assessments for the pur-
poses of taxation recognized no other basis than that 
of full value. Consequently the court determined 
that it was this full value which the constitution in-
tended as the basis for the determination of the debt 
limit. Therefore, it was held that the bonds could be 
legally issued. 
It should be noted that the case of C. B. Nash Co. 
v. City of Council Bluffs, 174 Fed 182 (U.S. Circuit 
Court S. D. Io\va, 1909) thro,vs some doubt on the 
figures but not the holding of the Belle Plaine case. 
This was an equity suit to enjoin the defendant Iowa 
City and officers from issuing "bonds or other obli-
gations" in the amount of $600,00 for the purpose of 
raising money to buy or construct a system of water-
works. The court was called upon to decide whether 
the constitutional five per cent limitation was based 
on the full value or the assessed value of the property 
in the city, and brought out in its opinion that the Su-
preme Court of Iowa was mistaken in its figure 
regarding the existing indebtedness aside from the 
proposed issue in the Belle Plaine case. The case 
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as reported in 104 N.W. 495 recited $8,000, and the 
report of the case in 128 Iowa 467 recited $80,000. 
Apparently the case was determined on an agreed 
statement of facts without other testimony wherein 
the existing indebtedness was agreed to be $8,000. 
Subsequent to the time it vvas typed, the opinion was 
changed so that it read $80,000 in the official files, 
but the Federal Court held in the Nash case that no 
matter what was the actual indebtedness of the city 
in the Belle Plaine case, what the state court decided 
was that the indebtedness should be determined ac-
cording to the full valuation and, therefore, the Fed-
eral Court so held in this case. 
The Belle Plaine case was followed by the Iowa 
Supreme Court in Reed v. the City of Cedar Rapids, 
113 N.W. 773 ( 1907) and in lVliller v. City of Glen-
wood, 176 N.W. 373 (1920). --
In Hansen v. City of Hoquiam, 163 Pac. 391 
(1917) a similar question was before the Washing-
ton Supreme Court. Section 6 of Article 8 of the 
State Constitution read: 
"No county, city, town, school district, or other 
municipal corporation shall for any purpose be-
come indebted in any manner to an amount 
exceeding one and one-half per centum of the 
taxable property in such county, city, town, 
school district, or other municipal corporation, 
without the assent of three fifths of the voters 
therein voting at an election to be held for 
that purpose, nor in cases requiring such 
assent shall the total indebtedness at any time 
exceed five per centum on the value of the tax-
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able property therein to be ascertained be the 
last assessment for state and county purposes 
previous to the incurring of such indebtedness, 
except that in incorporated cities the assessment 
shall be taken from the last assessment for city 
purposes. * * *" (Emphasis supplied) 
and the assessn1ents at the time involved in this case 
were made in harmony with Remington's Code, Sec-
tion 9112, which required that "all property shall be 
assessed at not to exceed fifty per cent of its true and 
fair value in money." The court found that: 
"The conditions of our problem are such that 
if the assessed value so fixed upon which taxes 
were to be computed is the amount which is to 
become the basis for computation of the consti-
tutional debt limit, then it may be conceded that 
the 5 per cent debt limit was exceeded in the in-
curring of a considerable portion of the debts 
here involved. On the other hand, it is plain 
from the record before us that if the real value 
of the property within the city as determined 
by the assessing officers for the years in ques-
tion is to become the basis for computation of 
the 5 per cent debt limit, then such debt limit 
was not exceeded in the incurring of any of the 
indebtedness here involved." 
The court deterr.ained that the meaning of the 
constitutional limitation was that the full value be 
used as the basis of calculations. 
The Montana Supreme Court likewise decided 
the issue in State v. Board of Commissioners of Hill 
County, 185 Pac. 456 (1919). Section 5 of Article 
13 of the State Constitution provided: 
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"No county shall be allo·wed to become indebt-
ed in any manner, or for any purpose, to an 
amount, including existing indebtedness, in the 
aggregate exceeding five ( 5) per centum of the 
( \~alue of the) taxable property therein, tO'be 
ascertained by the last assessment for state and 
county taxes previous to the incurring of such 
indebtedness." (Emphasis supplied) 
The court said : 
"At the time the Constitution was drafted, the 
statute provided that all taxable property should 
be assessed at its full cash value (section 1673, 
Fifth Div. Comp. Stat. 1887), and the same stat-
ute has been in force continuously since (sec-
tion 2502, Rev. Codes). In view of this declara-
tion of the public policy of the state, the lan-
guage of the Constitution above must be con-
strued to mean that the limit of county indebted-
ness is 5 per cent of the value of the taxable prop-
erty as that value is disclosed by the assessment 
roll; and since the only value which appears on 
the assessment roll is the value fixed by the 
county assessor as equalized by the county and 
state boards of equalization - that is, the full 
cash value- the expressions 'value of taxable 
property' and 'assessed valuation' mean the 
same thing. 
"Chapter 51, Laws of 1919, has nothing what-
ever to do with the assessment of property or the 
determination of the assessed valuation. It deals 
only with the imposition of taxes after the as-
sessment roll is completed and in the hands of 
the county clerk. Its provisions are directed to 
the clerk, and the extension of the taxes by him 
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involves only a matter of mathematical calcula-
tion- a mere ministerial duty. Hilger v. Moore, 
56 Mont. -182 Pac. 477. 
"Under the provisions of the constitution 
above, the limit of indebtedness is computed 
upon the assessed valuation as disclosed by the 
last assessment roll, and not upon the percentage 
of value upon which taxes are computed. The 
language is too plain to admit or doubt or to 
require the citation of authorities to support the 
conclusion; but, under like constitutional provi-
sions, the same rule of construction has been ap-
plied in other states. Halsey & Co. v. Belle 
Plaine, 128 Iowa 467, 104 N.W. 494; Hansen v. 
Hoquiam, 95 Wash. 132, 163 Pac. 391." (Em-
phasis supplied) 
In a similar situation the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana in Flanigan v. Police Jury of Jackson Par-
ish, 82 So. 722, ( 1919) held on original hearing that 
since the proposed indebtedness exceeded the consti-
tutional debt limit of 10o/o ("one-tenth of assessed 
valuation of the property within such minicipal, par-
ish, or drainage district, as shown by the last assess-
ment.") bonds could not be issued. On rehearing the 
court reversed this position and held : 
"In the present case we believe that by 'as-
·sessed valuation' the framers of the Constitu-
tion meant only the listing and valuing of the 
property as a basis upon which taxes were to be 
collected, and that they did not intend to include 
in that term the further process of the calcula-
tion of the amount to be paid by the taxpayers. 
In other words, the value written into the roll 
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by the assessor to represent the property, and 
the one factor in the process of taxation which 
remains constant for all purposes, save to the 
extent that it may be modified by the police jury 
as a board of reviewers, or by the board of state 
affairs, in the exercise of its powers of review, 
is the actual value fixed by the board. The pro-
ceedings from the assessor to the board are but 
steps in the reaching or fixing of that assessed 
valuation. When the roll and valuation is thus 
completed, each subdivision sits down to calcu-
late its alimony according to its needs. The ac-
tual value used is the same for all, and, we think, 
the true assessed value within the meaning of 
article 281 of the Constitution. Halsey v. Belle 
Plaine, 128 Iowa 467, 104 N.W. 494.'; 
The plaintiff does not deny that certain other 
jurisdictions have held that debt limits are to be com-
puted on the basis of the assessed value of the proper-
ty in the district. However, plaintiff believes that 
these cases should be distinguished on the ground that 
the language there being interpreted used the words 
"assessed value" rather than "value as ascer-
tained by the last previous assessment." Such was 
the fact in State v. Tolly, 16 S.E. 195 (South Caro-
lina, 1892) ;smith v:-Alistin, 76 So. 404 (Alabama, 
1917), and Phelps v. City of Minneapolis, 219 N.W. 
872 (Minnesota, 1928). In State v. Clausen, 199 Pac. 
752 ( 1921), the Supreme Court of Washington held 
that where the statutory language said "assessed 
valuation," that figure was to be used in determining 
the debt limit in view of the fact that the legislature 
had inserted the word "assessed" with the apparent 
intention of changing the law to make it include said 
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basis rather than the full value basis which it had 
included as determined by Hansen v. Hoquiam, 
supra. In the cases which plaintiff has cited in favor 
of the proposition that full value should govern, it 
should be noted that the phrase which set the basis 
was the same as, or similar to, the language in the 
Utah Constitution and that the word "assessed" did 
not precede the word "value" except in the Louisiana 
case where, even then, the court held that the full 
value should govern. 
In these cases upholding the "full value" theory 
the courts relied heavily on the fact that at the time 
the state constitutions were adopted, the law required 
assessments to be at full cash value. Indeed, until 
such time as a state had been in existence for many 
years it could not be expected that assessments would 
be substantially lower than that amount. It has been 
common to the history of a large number of states that 
as a matter of practice assessments gradually become 
lower than the actual value of property assessed over 
a period of years. So, at the time of the adoption of a 
constitution it is hardly likely that the framers there-
of would anticipate a situ;;:ttion in which assessments 
would be less than full value. This indeed was the 
case in Utah where the territorial law explicitely re-
quired full value assessments. See Compiled Laws of 
Utah 1888, page 720, Section 2010: 
"Property other than money shall be assessed 
at a fair cash valuation ... " 
Page 724, Section 2024, Compiled Laws of Utah 1888 
requires that the assessor ascertain all property in 
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the county, "real and personal, subject to taxation 
... and (he) shall determine the fair cash value of 
such property, and shall so list and assess the same 
to the person, firm, corporation, association or com-
pany ovvning or having the possession, charge, or con-
trol thereof, and make returns to the county court." 
Such a requirement was carried into the Revised 
Statutes of 1898, Section 2506, which provides: "all 
taxable property must be assessed at its full cash 
value." This language appeared in the Compiled 
Laws of 1907, Section 2506, in the Compiled Laws of 
1917, Section 5866 and, until1947, in the Ut~h Code 
Annotated 1943, Section 80-5-1. Thus, it is shown 
that at the time of the adoption of the Utah Constitu-
tion in 1895 and for many years thereafter the full 
cash value was the standard upon which assessments 
were made, and consequently it vvas this value which 
was used as a basis for determining the constitutional 
debt limit. The effect of the 1947 amendment reduc-
ing assessed valuations by sixty per cent was soon 
found to have had the effect of reducing the debt in-
curring powers of school districts by the same per-
centage and to make impossible the carrying out of 
necessary school construction programs. The Legis-
lature in amending Section 75-13-12 in 1951 was 
merely endeavoring to restore to school districts the 
full debt incurring power granted them by the con-
stitution. 
While it is not plaintiff's contention that the 
1947 amendment to Section 80-5-1 of the Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943, is unconstitutional, it may never-
theless be unconstitutional. Two years after the 
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adoption of the present constitution the Utah Su-
preme Court in State ex rei Cunningham v. Thomas, 
16 U. 86, 50 Pac. 615 ( 1897) indicated that there 
might be a constitutional requirement that assess-
ments be at full value. The case concerned the right 
of the State Board of Equalization so to raise the total 
valuation of the property of any county in the state 
as to increase the aggregate valuation of all the coun-
ties in the state. In determining that the Board had 
this power, the court considered Article 13, Section 
2 of the Constitution, which required that all tangible 
property in the state not exempt under the laws of 
the United States or of the Utah Constitution "be 
taxed in proportion to its value to be extended as pro-
vided by law," and Section 3, which said: 
"The legislature shall provide by law a uni-
form and equal rate of assessment and taxation 
on all property in the state, according to its value 
in money, and shall prescribe by general law 
such regulations as shall secure a just valuation 
for taxation of all property; so that every per-
son and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion 
to the value of his, her, or its property." 
The court said: 
"This provision is closely related to the one 
in section 2, and directs the legislature not only 
to provide a uniform and equal rate of assess-
ment and taxation, so that every subject owning 
property shall pay the same rate of tax as every 
other such subject, but also declares that all 
property shall be assessed at a basis which shall 
be 'according to its value in money.' It is evident 
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that the term 'according to its value in money' 
means that all property shall be valued, for the 
purposes of assessment, as near as is reasonably 
practicable, at its full cash value; in other words, 
that the valuation for assessment and taxation 
shall be, as near as reasonably practicable, equal 
to the cash price for which the property valued 
would sell in open market, for this is doubtless 
the correct test of the value of property." (Em-
phasis supplied) 
The court also said: 
"'All taxable property must be assessed at its 
full cash value. Land and the improvements 
thereon must be separately assessed.' As will 
be observed, there is nothing in either of these 
sections of the statute ·which conflicts \vith the 
provisions of sections 2 and 3 of the constitution. 
Under Section 5, all taxable property must be 
assessed at its full cash value; but, as we have 
seen, this is so under the constitution, and, as 
to assessing land and improvements separately, 
there is nothing in the constitution to prevent 
it." 
It should be noted that plaintiff's position, if ac-
cepted by the court, will not violate the constitutional 
requirement that taxes and assessments be uniform. 
Uniformity in assessments and taxes will not be af-
fected whether assessments be made at full cash value 
or at 407o thereof so long as made equally throughout 
the state. 
It is not necessary that the consti tu tionali ty of 
the 1947 amendment to Section 80-5-1 of the Utah 
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Code Annotated, 1943, be decided here, because the 
question in issue has to do with the determination 
of the meaning of the constitutional debt limit provi-
sion, and this meaning should be determined without 
reference to subsequent acts of the Legislature which 
concern only the mechanics of determining the 
amount of taxes to be paid on property of a given 
value. 
Plaintiff contends that in changing these me-
chanics by providing for a 40% assessment the Legis-
lature did not intend to change the substantive limit 
to which political subdivisions may incur debt so as 
to put it out of the Legislature's power to restore that 
full limit to the aforesaid political subdivisions. It 
may be that the Legislature could reduce this limit 
by statute if it so desired, but plaintiff urges that no 
such result should be implied here in the absence of 
a statutory provision so requiring. Indeed, the 1951 
amendment to Section 75-13-12 is a clear expression 
of legislative intent that the debt limit not be so re-
duced. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, plaintiff argues that his prayer for 
a writ of mandamus compelling defendant clerk to 
sign the bonds in question should be granted for the 
following reasons: ( 1) The total debt of the district, 
including the aforesaid bonds, will not exceed the 
statutory limit of four per cent of the reasonable fair 
cash value of the property in the district as provided 
in Section 75-13-12 of the Utah Code Annotated, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
1943, as amended. (2) This statute as amended is 
not unconstitutional in fixing the fair cash value 
rather than the assessed value as the basis for com-
puting debt limit. (3) The constitution, Article 8, 
Section 4, requires only that school district indebted-
ness not exceed four per cent of the reasonable fair 
cash value of the taxable property therein; to inter-
pret it otherwise would cause the constitutional debt 
limit to vary with the statutory assessment rate and 
would violate the substantive intent of the Constitu-
tion of Utah as framed and as adopted by the people. 
ROMNEY, BOYER & BERTOCH 
Appearing as Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1409 Walker Bank Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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